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I.
Overview
Uniformity of law figures prominently in the first century of American federalism. Just thirteen years after the Declaration of Independence of 1776, the United States of America
abandoned its first constitution and adopted a new one that
provided for more uniform law. The Constitution of 1789,
however, recognized and perpetuated, a non-uniform law of
slavery. To abolish that non-uniform law of slavery the country
fought the bloody Civil War (1861-1865). With abolition of slavery, the United States rejected the idea that component states
might have fundamentally different social, economic, or political systems.
Until 1865 division over slavery obscured a general need
for uniform law that was growing parallel to the development
of modern means of transportation and communication. In
1776 travel was rare; commerce among component states was
∗
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of minor importance. Within a century, all that had changed.
Merchants carried on trade in every state; citizens of all states
established relations with each other. The founding in 1878 of
the American Bar Association well marks the national need: the
first article of the Association’s constitution made a first purpose of the association “uniformity of legislation throughout
the Union.”
Before the Civil War representatives acting for
component states negotiated political solutions to this one great
national issue of disharmonious legislation. They left largely
unattended other issues of uniform law. The principal role of
the national United States Supreme Court was to preserve
against particularistic state intrusion areas for federal
legislation. Political realities ruled out political solutions to
national needs for uniform law.
Prior to the Civil War Supreme Court Justice Joseph
Story despaired that the nation was “perpetually receding
farther and farther from the common standard.”1 The divisive
issue of slavery in effect required seeking uniform law through
means that were less-overtly political. Story himself used a
variety of ways to promote uniform law. He authored
important court decisions that gave uniform federal law
preëminence. He wrote commentaries that formed the basis of
harmonized state law.2 He chaired one of the first major reports
on codification. He taught at the first truly national law school.
After the Civil War, with the issue of slavery resolved,
the nation could give attention to the importance of uniform
law for the rapidly growing commerce among the states. No
longer, however, did representatives acting for component
Joseph Story, Progress of Jurisprudence, An Address Delivered Before the Members of the
Suffolk Bar, at Their Anniversary, at Boston (Sept. 4, 1821), in THE MISCELLANEOUS
WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 198, 213, 224 (William W. Story ed., 1852).
1

2

And this American legal writers did from the earliest of publications. See, e.g.,
AMERICAN PRECEDENTS OF DECLARATIONS iii-iv (1802) (“the work, though more
immediately applicable to the practice of New-England, may be considered as
adapted by form, and qualified by authority, to invite the attention and meet the
necessities of every State in the Union.”).
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states negotiate political solutions to these needs. Instead,
shifting coalitions of interested parties persuaded the central
government or the individual component states to adopt
uniform or harmonized legal rules. No longer was the principal
role of the national United States Supreme Court in legal
unification to determine what states could do without
infringing federal prerogatives; it became to decide what the
central government might do without violating states’ rights.
Two post-Civil War developments mightily furthered
this more expansive federal role. The post-Civil War amendments to the Constitution, especially the fourteenth amendment of 1868 assuring rights of citizenship and due process
throughout the Union, resulted in new, expansive powers for
the federal government. Meanwhile, the ever growing
commerce among the component states led the central
government to seek to satisfy those needs with greater federal
involvement. At first slowly, and then decisively with the
development of the administrative state in the “New Deal” of
the 1930s, the Supreme Court acquiesced in an expanded role
of the central government.
Today, the picture of federalism remains much the same
as that which developed in the the century following the Civil
War: consensus based approaches that do not involve governments negotiating with each another. These are principally
three:
(1) The central government, relying on pre-existing
federal powers, adopts laws that apply nationwide. These
federal laws usually do not displace state law completely. The
component states, to the extent necessary, adjust their laws to
coordinate with national laws.
(2) The component states, either in imitation of the law
of one leading state or of the federal government or following
uniform and model laws proposed principally by the National
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Law (founded
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by the states in 1892) or the American Law Institute (founded
by academic and practicing lawyers in 1923), adopt
substantially similar laws.
(3) Both the central government and the component
states in the interest of national harmony rely on third party
harmonization through “restatements” of law and other
academic and non-binding interpretations of laws as well as on
decisions of private, national-standards setting bodies (e.g.,
trade associations).
In all of this the national Supreme Court plays what
sometimes seems a capricious role: generally it accepts those
consensus decisions, but from time-to-time, at the request
usually of private parties and rarely of component state
representatives, it determines that the nationally-agreed upon
federal rule impermissibly infringes on state authority.
II.
The Federal Distribution and Exercise of Lawmaking Power
The location of lawmaking powers is rightly the first
question in reporting on uniform laws in federal entities.
Unification of laws is needed only if lawmaking powers rest
with more than one entity. If lawmaking powers are reserved
to the central government, laws are perforce uniform. But if
states enjoy lawmaking power, uniformity of law is challenged.
Absent concerted efforts to make laws uniform, anything like
uniformity is apt to be the result of accident.3
Americans assume that extensive lawmaking powers are
essential to every level of a multigovernmental entity. How can
an entity be federal if its component states do not have
independent law making authority? How can a locality have
home rule if it cannot write its own laws? Foreign examples
challenge this assumption. An entity can properly be seen as
3

Cf., TIMOTHY WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW § 144, at p. 149 (1837).
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federal, even though some, or perhaps all, lawmaking powers
are concentrated with the central government. Component
states are no less independent and decentralization is no less
furthered by different models where lawmaking is a cooperative endeavor of the component states at the central level and
lawapplying is devolved upon the component states. It is well
to remember that there is no unitary form of federalism and
that different forms may use different admixtures of these
models.
This Part II addresses distribution of lawmaking powers
in American federalism. The following Part III considers
approaches used to bring uniformity when those powers are
exercised in appyling law. Part IV deals with the institutional
and social background of uniform law. Part V is a unification
“scorecard,” while Part VI is a conclusion.
1. The limited legislative jurisdiction of the central authority
a. Federal powers
The Constitution of the United States of America creates
a federal government of limited powers. Article I, section 8 sets
out the lawmaking powers of Congress. It is the principal
source of federal legislative authority. Article VI prescribes that
where the federal government has legislative power, federal
law is supreme. Article 1, section 10, proscribes certain conduct
by the states. The tenth amendment, adopted in 1791, reserves
powers not delegated to the federal government, to the states.
Article 1, section 8 bestows upon the federal legislature
(Congress) powers: 1. “To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; …” (the
“General Welfare Clause”); 2. to borrow money; 3. “To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes” (the “Commerce Clause”); 4. “To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws
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on the Subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;”
5. to coin Money and fix the standard of weights and measures;
6. To punish counterfeiting; 7. To establish post offices and post
roads; 8. To secure to authors and inventors the exclusive right
to their respective writings and discoveries (the “Patent and
Copyright Clause”); 9. To constitute Tribunals inferior to the
Supreme Court; 10. To define and punish offences against the
Law of Nations; 11. To declare war; 12. To raise and support
Armies; 13. To provide and maintain a Navy; 14. To make rules
for the same; 15. To call forth the Militia to execute the Laws of
the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; 16. To
make rules for the same; 17. “To exercise exclusive Legislation
over the Seat of the Government;” and, 18. “To make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof (the “Necessary and Proper
Clause”). Article II, section 2 bestows upon the President, with
“the advice and consent of the Senate (i.e., the upper house of
the legislature), the power to make treaties (the “Foreign Affairs
Power”). Article III, section 2, provides that national judicial
power shall extend to “all cases arising under this Constitution,
the laws of the United States, and treaties made … under their
authority” as well as certain other controversies involving the
United States or parties from different states or nations.
While all lawmaking powers are in principle enumerated, some are so general that a power is available if the political will is present. Often it is. The federal government need not
wait for states to take action. That it does take action, does not,
however, as we shall discuss below, oust the states of lawmaking jurisdiction completely.
Education law is an example of how quickly leadership
can change when political will is present. For a long time any
federal involvement in education, other than in funding higher
education, met with substantial resistance. States, often following the lead of national accrediting and testing bodies, deter-
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mined the law. But the in the 2000s the central government
sought to set national standards for local education.
b. Few federal lawmaking powers are exclusive; most
are concurrent with lawmaking powers of component
states
Were federal powers all exclusive—as was argued by
some in the early years of the country 4—federal law would be
uniform and this report could be limited to areas outside federal lawmaking authority. But that view did not prevail. The Supreme Court rejected it in 1819 in the case of Sturges v. Crowninshield, 5 where it held that federal power to create uniform
laws on the subject of bankruptcy is not exclusive so long as
Congress is not currently exercising that power.
In those early years the Supreme Court followed the approach laid out in the Federalist, No. 32, which identifies three
categories of exclusive federal powers in the Constitution. 6 The
first category consists of those powers that the Constitution expressly designates “exclusive.” The only such power is the
power over the national seat of government (no. 17 above). In
the second category are those powers that the Constitution
grants to the federal government and expressly denies to the
states (principally in article I, section 10). These include powers
to enter into treaties, coin money, impose duties on imports or
exports, maintain armies, and conduct war. The Federalist’s
third category cannot be linguistically, but only politically defined. It consists of those powers that the Constitution grants
the federal government, where, according to the Federalist, “a

4 See, e.g., Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 122 (1819) (arguments of
Daggett and Hopkinson for plaintiff). See also Joseph Story, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 444, p. 428 (1833); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 145-150
(1985).
5 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 122.
6 JOSEPH STORY, CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, § 437, at 422.
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similar authority in the states would be absolutely and totally
CONTRADICTORY and REPUGNANT.”7
Few federal powers fall into the Federalist’s first and
second categories; most are in the third. Since the Supreme
Court has hesitated to find federal powers broadly exclusive,
most federal lawmaking powers are concurrent with the powers of the states.
Concurrency conflicts with the objective of uniformity of
law and is a catalyst for uniform lawmaking. For where federal
legislative jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the states, absent uniform laws, and perhaps even then, law is anything but
uniform. As we shall see, in this “interjurisdictional gray area”
there is a “conflict and confusion.”8
c. The most important federal powers
The most important constitutionally specified sources
authorizing central government regulation are the General
Welfare Clause, the Commerce Clause, the Patent and Copyright Clause, the various clauses related to national defense, the
Foreign Affairs Power, and the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Where potential legislation does not clearly fall under
one of the powers specifically stated, the most likely basis for
federal regulation is either the Commerce Clause alone or the
Commerce Clause in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Federal regulation is often piecemeal. State law is, in
theory, organic. Federal law is to supplement state law to deal
with specific issues that require national treatment. This is just
the reverse of providing a general federal rule from which
1 THE FEDERALIST: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS WRITTEN IN FAVOUR OF THE NEW CONSTINo. 32 (1788) [emphasis in original].
8 So called by Erin Ryan in Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and
Balance in the Intrjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503 (2007).
7
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component states are permitted to deviate. It means that federal regulation is often neither comprehensive nor systematic. 9
The Commerce Clause by its terms authorizes the
federal government “To regulate commerce … among the
several States.” Some people at the time of its adoption thought
that this was a power to regulate commerce generally among
the states. 10 Instead, the Supreme Court viewed the power
more narrowly. It sought to distinguish commerce that it saw
as properly concerning the federal government and commerce
that concerned only the component states. The task of drawing
clear lines proved impossible to achieve. In the very case where
the Supreme Court first attempted to measure state statutes
against federal legislative power, Gibbons v. Ogden, Justice
Johnson presciently warned that the competing powers “meet
and blend so as scarcely to admit of separation.” 11
In nearly two centuries of interpreting the Commerce
Clause the Supreme Court has vacillated from expounding it
expansively to reading it restrictively. The Court has prescribed
one test or another to judge whether a particular exercise of
federal authority is proper (e.g., “channels or instrumentalities
of commerce,” “in commerce,” “affecting commerce”).
In deciding this question, the Supreme Court has little
political legitimacy on which to rely, since it is not elected.
Faced with demands for federal action in response to the Great
Depression of the 1930s, the Court largely ceded this issue as a
political decision to Congress. Only more recently, in the boom
economic times of the 1990s, did the court—to general
consternation—revisit the issue and invalidate a federal law

The approach is reminiscent of how common law courts construe statutes in derogation of the common law.
10 See., e.g., JAMES SULLIVAN, THE HISTORY OF LAND TITLES IN MASSACHUSETTS 352-355
(1801); see generally WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (3 vols., 1953, 1980).
11 6 U.S. (9 Wheaton) 1, 32 (1824). The Court did not accept the argument that
whenever Congress “declines to establish a law, it is to be considered a declaration
that it is unfit that such a law should exist.”
9
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based on the Commerce Clause. 12 The law in question
prohibited carrying firearms in schools; it regulated “noneconomic activity” and therefore, in this Court’s view, fell
outside the legislative authority of the federal government. The
result of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence
is to complicate federal legislation and to inhibit, but not
prohibit, broader national solutions to problems.
d. Important practice areas of federal regulation
In American legal practice, a common expression is
“don’t make a federal case out of it.” While coined with litigation in mind, it speaks to the division in legal practice of federal
and state matters. Commercially and politically important matters are largely issues of federal law; day-to-day mundane matters are typically issues of state law. Large law firms deal with
the former; solo practitioners handle the latter. So matters of
traditional private law, e.g., contracts, family law, inheritance,
real property, are largely state law. Major commercial matters,
other than corporate organization itself, are usually federal law.
Some areas in which federal law has a strong or dominant role include:
Competition law. It consists of antitrust, unfair competition and trademark law. Although it is principally federal law,
yet there are significant state and even municipal laws that also
regulate the field. Moreover, local authorities not infrequently
enforce federal laws.
Employment and labor law. Although the federal involvement is high, states still set the basic tenor. In practice, most
states adhere to an employment-at-will doctrine which permits
employers (and employees) largely unlimited freedom to sever
the employment relationship. Federal law overlays this state
law with many particular regulations governing such disparate
topics as discrimination among employees based on personal
12

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).

U.S. National Report

11

characteristics (such as age, gender, national origin, race and
religion), sexual harassment, equal pay, and labor unions.
Environmental law. Basic property law, including landuse planning, is quintessentially state law. Yet there is an overlay of all manner of federal law from A for Asbestos School
Hazard Detection and Control, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq., to T for
Toxic Substance Control, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq.
Securities law. The laws under which business organizations are formed are state laws, but the principal laws under
which large public corporations are regulated and pursuant to
which obligations to shareholders are determined, are federal.
Tax law is based on authority other than the Commerce
Clause, namely on the General Welfare Clause. While the component states have extensive taxes of their own, excepting taxes
on real estate and on turnover, federal tax law is the most important and largely sets the rules de facto by which state taxes
are assessed.
2. The organic legislative jurisdiction of the component states
a. State powers
The component states are the organic sources of government authority in the United States. Each state has its own
constitution from which authority to legislate arises. The federal Constitution assumes the existence of the component states.
The federal government can not abolish the states or fundamentally alter the nation’s composition. Article IV, section 3,
while allowing Congress to admit new states, provides that “no
new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of
any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two
or more States, or parts of States, without the Consent of the
Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.”
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The Constitution, with a minor exception relating to
state militia, contains no explicit grant of exclusive legislative
jurisdiction to the component states; its tenth amendment,
however, reserves powers not delegated to the central government, to the component states.
Since the federal government is a government of limited
authority, and the states maintain the organic law-giving competence, to this day state law dominates core areas of public
and private law, including most criminal and civil law. The latter includes contracts, family, inheritance, property, tort and
corporate law. States determine the organization of, and the
procedures used by, their courts.
Areas where state law is dominant, but shares authority
with federal law include consumer protection, criminal law,
education law, gambling law and traffic and driving law.
3.

Conflicts and coordination of state and federal law
a. Supremacy of federal law

Article VI, section 2 provides that federal law is supreme
(the “Supremacy Clause”) 13. The lowest of federal laws is superior to conflicting provisions of state laws, including state constitutions.
The Supreme Court has given federal law a greater
priority than the Supremacy Clause strictly requires. It has not
limited the Supremacy Clause to being a mere choice-of-law
rule that determines which law applies in the case of a conflict.14 Instead, it has held that in certain situations, federal leg“This Constitution and the Law of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States; shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.”
14 Cf. JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
441, p. 425 (“Are the state laws inoperative only to the extent of the actual conflict; or
13
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islation preempts state legislation entirely. This happens most
easily, when a federal statute states that it preempts state law.
In such cases, a court has only to determine whether state law
is inconsistent with federal law. But federal law may also implicitly preempt state law if it “stands as an obstacle to accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.” 15 The Supreme Court may find this to be the case
when there is “conflict preemption” or there is “field preemption.” The former is the case where state law contravenes federal purposes or requires action that conflicts with federal law.
The latter occurs when federal regulation of a particular field is
“so dominant” that state laws on the same subject should not
operate. 16
State governments, and even municipal governments, in
areas of concurrent state/federal legislative competency, sometimes adopt legislation that is inconsistent with federal legislation. This legislation is presumptively valid until such time as a
court, acting in a concrete case or controversy, determines that
the state legislation is invalid as preempted by federal legislation or by a grant of federal legislative authority.
b. Non-exercise of federal powers and state law
Non-exercise of federal powers in the early years of the
country made it more difficult to determine when a power
should be exclusive. For some things, the country could not
wait. For example, for more than fifty years after the constitutional convention, Congress did nothing about setting national
standards for weights and measures. So the “common understanding was, that until Congress should fix a general standard
for the states, each state was “at liberty to fix one for itself.”17

does the legislation of congress supersede the state legislation, or suspend the legislative power of the states over the subject matter?”).
15 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
16 See English v. General Electric Company, 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
17 WALKER, supra note 3.
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The difficulty non-exercise made for interpretation is
well illustrated by the Supreme Court’s contrasting treatment
of the two powers the Constitution grants in clause 4 of article
I, section 8: “4. To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,
and uniform Laws on the Subject of Bankruptcies throughout
the United States.” Although the Constitution uses virtually the
same language for both powers and combines them in the same
clause, the Court held the former exclusive18 and the latter concurrent. 19
In the case of the Naturalization Power, the Court followed the argument of the Federalist: the Naturalization Power
falls within the third category “because if each state had power
to prescribe a DISTINCT RULE, there could be no UNIFORM
RULE.”20 Of course, the same argument seems to be true equally
of the Bankruptcy Power, which the Federalist did not address.
But the Court held otherwise. The principal difference between
the two cases is that Congress had always exercised the Naturalization Power while it had only intermittently exercised the
Bankruptcy Power.21
The Supreme Court does not, however, allow state legislation in every instance of unexercised federal power. For example, in the case of state regulation of commerce, it applies
the doctrine of the “dormant Commerce Clause.” Under this
doctrine it may invalidate state or local laws that “discriminate
against” 22 or impose an “undue burden” 23 on “interstate commerce.”
c. Coordination of state and federal law
Unlike more modern federal constitutions, the American
Constitution of 1789 does not address directly how state and
Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheaton) 259 (1817).
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 122 (1819).
20 1 THE FEDERALIST: supra note 7 [emphasis in original].
21 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17. U.S. (4 Wheaton) 122 (1819)
22 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978).
23 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 353 (1951).
18
19

U.S. National Report

15

federal governments should coordinate their laws. It does not
well demark areas where federal legislative jurisdiction is exclusive and where it is shared with the states. It does not define
what exclusive and what concurrent might mean. But it does
allow a high level of concurrency in lawmaking.
The combination of these two factors—lack of constitutional coordination and a high incidence of concurrent jurisdiction—contributes mightily to non-uniformity and uncertainty.
It creates a certain competition between state and federal law.
Competition between state and federal law need not
lead to substantial legal uncertainty, if conflicts between state
and federal authority are determined before laws take effect. 24
For this, coordination prior to litigation is essential. It is not
enough to say that one government level has authority to legislate, and to the extent that it does, its law governs and supersedes competing laws.
A particular weakness of American federalism is that
questions of legislative competency are often decided not beforehand, but only as a legal rule is applied, and therefore at the
risk and expense of those trying to comply with the law, whichever one it may be that is applicable. The issue of legislative
competency may even be an element of a party’s case. For example, to apply a federal law may require proof that this particular instance of application has a specific connection to “interstate commerce,” such as an “effect” on “interstate commerce” 25 or use of an “instrumentality of interstate commerce,
or of the mails.” 26 Conversely, to apply state law may require a

See James R. Maxeiner, Legal Certainty: A European Alternative to American Legal
Indeterminacy?, 15 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 541, 596 (2007) (discussing German federalism).
25 For example, the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S.
322 (1991).
26 For example, the securities laws. See, e.g., Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR 240.10b-5.
24
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showing that this specific application does not infringe on a
possibly not yet adopted federal law. 27
There is a point of view that such case-by-case review is
work worth doing notwithstanding the obvious greater efficiency of an ex ante, generalized decision. Some see that “the
challenge faced by the new commercial federalism [to] be in
establishing and policing the limits on federal power.”28 This
approach would “enable redress whenever a plaintiff with standing
shows that regulatory activity in the gray area unduly threatens Our
Federalism [with tyranny].” 29
5.

Municipalities

The Constitution makes no provision for municipalities.
As a matter of state law, municipalities have only such
authority as the states grant them. Originally, the states strictly
limited municipal authority. Beginning in the latter part of the
nineteenth century, however, states began extending to
municipalities “home rule.” Often, in addition to authority to
administer their own affairs, states granted municipalities
authority to legislate. Today municipalities are seen as the
intrastate analogue of federalism. Most states apply a rule that
all powers are granted until retracted. This includes authority
to issue laws as significant as creating criminal offenses,
imposing requirements on employment, prohibiting trade
practices and controlling construction through zoning laws.
There are approximately 40,000 sub-state government entities
in the United States.

Some American law professors now see this “competitive federalism,” i.e., nonuniformity of law, as a good thing! See, e.g., Bruce Johnson & Moin A. Yahya , The
Evolution of Sherman Act Jurisdiction: A Roadmap for Competitive Federalism, 7 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 403 (2004).
28
See A Brooke Overby, Our New Commercial Law Federalism, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 297, 356
(2003).
29
Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the
Intrjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 648 (2007).
27
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III.
The Means and Methods of Legal Unification
The means and methods of legal unification are the same
as the means and methods of lawmaking and law applying in
general. Thus unification takes place, or does not take place,
within the context of existing approaches to legal methods. In
this regard, the United States operates within its own peculiar
version of the common law.
The common law heritage is both blessing and bane for
American legal unification. It is a blessing, because it brings a
strong central court and a tradition of consistent case law. But it
is a bane, because conditions in the United States are different
than they were in 18th century England, when American common law methods developed in England. American courts are
less centralized than were their 18th century English counterparts; the limitations of a law of precedents are much greater in
a modern economy of 300 million people than they were in a
pre-industrial economy of fewer than 10 million people.30
In its Supreme Court the United States shares the common law benefit of a strong court at the seat of national government. Insofar as the Supreme Court is competent—both legally and practically—its pronouncements in Washington can
have much the same salutary effect for legal unification as
those of its counterparts in Westminster had in the 18th and 19th
centuries.

30

According to the first British census, in 1801 the population of England was 8,331,434.
ABSTRACT OF THE ANSWERS AND RETURNS, MADE PURSUANT TO THE ACT, PASSED IN THE FORTY-FIRST YEAR OF HIS MAJESTY KING GEORGE III, INTITULED, ‘AN ACT FOR TAKING AN ACCOUNT OF THE P OPULATION OF GREAT BRITAIN, AND THE INCREASE OR DIMUTION THEREOF,
ENUMERATION 4 (1802), available at Online Historical Population Reports,
http://www.histpop.org/ohpr/servlet/PageBrowser?path=Browse/Census%20(by%20date)&active
=yes&mno=2&tocstate=expandnew&tocseq=100&display=sections&display=tables&display=pa
getitles&pageseq=first-nonblank.
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As we have seen, however, for most of American law,
the Supreme Court is not legally competent. It therefore often is
not able to contribute substantially to unification of law. In
most areas of law, the Supreme Court of the United States is
not the highest court, instead the highest courts of the states
have the last word. There are fifty such courts. There are no
formal and only limited informal means for coordinating the
decisions of those fifty supreme courts.
Moreover, the precedents of the Supreme Court share
the deficiencies of case law generally. Precedents decide single
cases; they find a rule applicable to one case. They are not designed to decide abstractly and consistently a generality of cases. More precedents in theory clarify the law, but they also
muddy it by increasing exponentially the number of “authoritative” texts. Most American precedents these days descend
from the federal appellate courts or the state courts, and are not
decisions of the Supreme Court. They have binding effect only
on subordinate courts and do not bind coordinate courts or
their respective subordinate courts. Only the Supreme Court
can bind all courts and then only in matters of federal law. But
it renders full opinions in only about 80 cases a year.
While in 1837, the common law provided most American law, by 1937, if not sooner, statute law had displaced common law as the principal source of American law. Yet the United States has difficulty adopting and implementing statutes.
The American legal system has yet to develop efficient and effective methods of legislation.31 The United States, says Judge
Richard A. Posner, has no “overall theory of legislation.”32 An
overall theory of legislation requires methods of drafting and
methods of statutory interpretation. While the American legal
system has methods of statutory interpretation, these are, ac-

31 See James R. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America: U.S. Legal Methods and
the Rule of Law, 41 VALPARAISO U. L. REV. 517, 528 (2006).
32 Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 800 (1983).
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cording to Justice Antonin Scalia, unintelligible.33 It has no method of legislative drafting, which it has long neglected. 34 Individual Congressmen, not government ministries, are responsible for drafting legislation. Coalitions of Congressmen must
negotiate with each other and strike deals with the President to
get laws adopted. The consequences for legal unification are
substantial and negative: new legislation is difficult to adopt
and;35 its technical quality is apt to be poor.
1. Legal unification and harmonization by exercise of central
power
a.

Through constitutional norms

The Constitution as adopted in 1789 had few norms directly applicable to component states. Most of these concern
establishing state recognition of the laws and legal acts of other
states and of the federal government or prohibiting certain state
conduct (e.g., imposing customs duties, making treaties with
foreign countries). Among those few designed to create uniform norms, perhaps the most important and surely the most
controversial, was article IV, section 3, the nefarious “Fugitive
Slave Clause.” It requires (requires, for it has never been repealed), that persons “held to service or labor in one State under the laws therefore, escaping into another,” shall not be
freed, “but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom
such service or labor may be due.”
The Bill of Rights (the first ten amendments), adopted in
1791, also did not create norms directly applicable to the states;
it applied only to the federal government. 36 That changed,
however, following the adoption of the fourteenth amendment
Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 14 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
34 Mary Ann Glendon, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 33, at 96.
35 See Donald J. Smythe, Commercial Law in the Cracks of Judicial Federalism, 56 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 451, 459-461 (2007).
36 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 32 (1833).
33
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in 1868. While the amendment did not itself apply the Bill of
Rights to the states, the Supreme Court has interpreted its Due
Process Clause, which does apply to the States, to incorporate
the most important protections of the Bill of Rights.
The Supreme Court can and does—albeit infrequently—
use the protections of the Bill of Rights to create uniform law
throughout the land. The advantage of this approach is that
one Supreme Court decision instantly brings legal unification.
For example, on January 21, 1973, abortion was legal in some
states and illegal in others. On January 22, 1973, when the Supreme Court decided the case of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), it became legal in all states.
Necessarily only the Supreme Court can create such national unity. Since its authority extends only to deciding specific cases, it can not promulgate comprehensive legislative-like
solutions to problems. As a consequence the Court is better
able to harmonize law than it is to unify law. What the Court
does best is prohibit contradictory legislation. Less well can it
prescribe positive legislation, although it does occasionally prescribe specific rules. Where the Court does prescribe such national norms, typically these norms overwhelm any state rules.
Most commonly they are procedural. Typically they take their
names from the cases that promulgated them. Here are several
examples:
“Brady materials” 37. In criminal procedure prosecutors
must disclose certain information that may exculpate defendants or may impeach the testimony of witnesses against the
defendant (e.g., deals in exchange for testimony).
37 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice, Report and Recommendations on Compliance with the Prosecutorial
Duty
to
Disclose
Exculpatory
Evidence,
available
at
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/prosecutorial/official/OFFICIAL%20RE
PORT%20ON%20BRADY%20COMPLIANCE.pdf (March 6, 2008) (noting at 2 that
“The prosecutor’s Brady duty to disclose exculpatory evidence under the due process
clause of the United States constitution is wholly independent of any statutory
scheme. It is self-executing and needs no statutory support to be effective.”)
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“Miranda warnings.” 38 In criminal investigations, before
questioning a suspect, the police must inform the suspect of his
or her fifth amendment right not to make self-incriminating
statements. In the decision itself the Court prescribed specific
language. 39
While this approach has the virtue of immediate applicability, it has serious drawbacks. Constitutionalizing an issue
largely eliminates legislative solutions. Legislative solutions
can be political compromises. They can change as political
temperaments change. They can draw bright lines that are easy
to apply, even if they are not always easy to justify. Constitutional solutions are, by the nature of American constitutional
decision-making (see below), judge-made solutions normally
devoid of bright lines. They invite litigation to change them or
just to determine what they mean, for there is no other way to
obtain an authoritative interpretation. 40
b. Through directly applicable central legislation (or executive or administrative rules)
In a few areas of law, i.e., where the Constitution gives
Congress a clear grant of power, or where the courts hold that
grant to be exclusive, federal legislation brings uniform law.
These areas include naturalization, patents and copyrights. 41

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
Id. (“You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used
against you in a court of law. You have the right to speak to an attorney, and to have
an attorney present during any questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will
be provided for you at government expense.”)
40 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 45 (1987)
(“But if the courts unnecessarily decide such controversies on constitutional
grounds, these potentially creative and collaborative processes are brought to a
halt.”)
41
To promote uniform interpretation and application of patent and copyright law, in
1982 Congress created a new appellate court to decide all such appeals. It is an unusual creature in a system that prefers generalist to specialist courts.
38
39
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In those areas where Congress shares legislative authority with the states, it has been hesitant to oust states of concurrent jurisdiction and timid even in asserting its own. The working assumption is that the federal role should be limited unless
there is a compelling reason to assert federal leadership exists.42
Congress has usually resisted requests that it occupy
systematically a distinct field of law to the exclusion of the
states. Indeed, unless one defines distinct field narrowly, it may
never have done so.
For example, many have long looked to Congress for a
national commercial law; for more than two centuries, all who
have done so, have been disappointed. Already in 1801, James
Sullivan, then attorney general and later governor of Massachusetts, urged that “[t]here ought to be one uniform rule
throughout the nation, on bills of exchange, promissory notes,
policies, and all personal contracts [for these] all arise from
commerce, and the regulation of them is the regulation of
commerce itself.” 43 Other equally distinguished jurists and
well-placed advocates made similar proposals in the 1880s and
again in the 1920s and 1930s. Their calls induced not national
commercial law, but did contribute to efforts to find state alternatives to a national law. They were catalysts for creation of the
National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform States Laws
in 1892 and for the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code
in the 1940s and 1950s. 44
Congress, when it does act, often does not cover a whole
field, but only sections of it, or even only specific problems
within a section. An example is data protection, which is also
known as privacy law. The United States was among the first
countries to adopt a data protection law, but applied it only to
42

See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVI108, 110 (2005).
43 SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 353.
44 See E. Hunter Taylor, Federalism or Uniformity of Commercial Law, 11 RUTGERSCAMDEN L.J. 527, 529-530 (1980).
RONMENTAL L.J.
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consumer credit reports. 45 Since then many countries have
adopted data protection laws; most have adopted what are referred to as “omnibus” laws that apply to personal data generally. The United States, even as it slowly followed the lead of
other countries in expanding data protection, stayed true to
what is called a “sectoral” approach. The sectoral approach
made the United States something of a laughing-stock in international discourse in the 1990s, when the United States protected video tape rental and sale records46 long before it protected financial 47 and health records. 48
The protection of health records is an example of Congress delegating authority to create uniform rules through administrative rule rather than federal statute.
Federal direct legislation is thus paradoxical: federal law
can be found in nearly every aspect of life, yet there are surprisingly few areas of practice based exclusively on federal law.
c. Through central legislation inducing state legislation
The federal government cannot compel states to adopt
legislation. Such measures are considered an infringement of
the sovereign prerogatives of the component states. 49 Thus the
United States is not able to adapt the directive approach of the
European Union or the framework laws approach of Germany.
While Congress hesitates to preempt state lawmaking
power, it practically rushes to use federal legislation to induce
states to adopt laws that coordinate with federal policies and
Fair Credit Reporting Act, adopted in 1973, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.
Video Privacy Protection Act, adopted in 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710. The Act does not
cover DVDs, since they had yet to be commercialized.
47 Gramm-Leach-Blilely Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, adopted in
1999, 15 U.S.C. § 6801, et seq.
48 The Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information (“Privacy
Rule”), 45 CFR Part 160 and Subparts A and E of Part 164, implementing the requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), Public Law 104-191.
49 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
45
46
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thereby harmonize with one another. Congress uses approaches far too numerous to detail here. Most go under the name of
“cooperative federalism.” That the result is cacophony rather
than harmony is not an unusual judgment.50
A mundane example suggests the problematic nature of
such cooperation. The Consumer Patient Radiation Health and
Safety Act of 198151 directed the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to develop minimum standards for state certification
and licensure of personnel who administer ionizing or nonionizing radiation in medical and dental radiologic procedures.
The Act does not require adoption of the standards and does
not sanction non-adoption. Only 35 states developed standards.
According to the professional organization behind such licensing, these standards “vary dramatically” from state-to-state.
The remaining 15 states, the professional organization reports,
essentially have no standards (requiring two weeks, not two
years of training). 52
This lack of success of the law illustrates the limits of the
cooperative federalism approach. Without compulsion, either
binding law or a practically equivalent fiscal measure, not all
states go along; those that do, do not do so uniformly. The result, at best, is harmonized law; it is not uniform law.
It is sometimes suggested that the threat of federal legislation leads to states adopting legislation as a lesser evil. This
See, e.g., Jonathan Adler, Jurisdiction Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14
N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL L.J. 130 (2005) (“The division of authority and responsibility
for environmental protection between the federal and state governments lacks any
cohesive rationale or justification.”). See also Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL L.J. 179 (2005); A. Brooke
Overby, Our New Commercial Law Federalism, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 297 (2003).
51 42 U.S.C. §§ 10001-10008.
52 American Society of Radiologic Technologists, Background Information on State
and Federal Licensure Issues,
https://www.asrt.org/content/GovernmentRelations/LegislativeGuidebook/Licen
sureBackgroundInfo.aspx
50
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seems to have been an explanation for the creation of the Uniform Commercial Code. But in most instances, where legislation does not go through the NCCUSL process, if there is such
a reaction, i.e., if it leads to legislation, that legislation is likely
to be disparate and not uniform, and is likely to be adopted by
some, but not by all states.
This approach is less likely to come out of the central
government than from local constituencies. What is more likely
to happen is that one constituency, with greater or lesser access
to legislative influence, suggests a need for a national rule. It, or
other constituencies then seek state legislation as an alternative
to federal legislation.

states

d. Through information exchanges among the component

Information exchanges among component states are an
important source of coordination, but these are rarely managed
by the central government. More commonly, national organizations, e.g., the National Association of Attorneys General, the
National Center for State Courts, or national trade associations,
do the managing.
2. Legal unification through formal or informal voluntary
coordination among component states
a. By component state legislatures imitating others
Imitation, which is a form of informal coordination, is
one of the most important methods for attaining harmonization, if not unification, in American law. Uniform and model
laws promote this imitation, but do not exhaust it. Success with
formal uniform laws voluntarily adopted has been limited. See
3.a. and 3.b. below.
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b. By component state judiciaries, e.g., through state
court consideration of practice of sister states
This is essentially the restatement approach, considered
below, but without the validation of the precedents reviewed
by the American Law Institute. Little can be expected of this
approach. It cannot possibly be systematic or comprehensive,
nor can it be uniform or universal. Owing to the vagaries of litigation, a court can consider only issues that arise in a specific
case. Owing to limitations of case law, a court can decide only
issues on the facts of this case. Owing to the proliferation of
precedents, a court can hardly review all those precedents that
might possibly come into play. No longer is it reasonable to expect a judge—especially a trial judge—to review decisions
around the country. 53 Owing to the irregularity of litigation, it
should not be expected that the same issue would even come
before the highest courts of all fifty states, not to mention be
decided in the same way.
c. By agreements among component states
Component states in the United States may agree with
each other to legislation or administrative rules. Article I, section 10, clause 3 of the Constitution requires that the federal
government approve such “interstate compacts.” While use of
interstate compacts has become more common in recent years,
the focus of most compacts is not on creating uniform law. Typically interstate compacts are regional and are concerned with
matters of administration rather than of legislation.
3.

Legal unification promoted by non-state actors

Two non-state actors play a prominent role in promoting
legal unification: the National Conference of Commissioners of
Uniform State Law (“NCCUSL”) and the American Law Institute (“ALI”). The two bodies differ in their basic approach, but
53

See Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 31, at 543.
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both depend on voluntary adoption of their products. Besides
these two law reform organizations, a host of other private organizations ranging from associations of government officials
to university think tanks offer model laws to the nation’s legislatures for possible adoption. 54
a. Uniform laws and NCCUSL
The National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform
State Law was founded in 1892 by the states themselves. The
states are represented in NCCUSL as state delegations.
NCCUSL drafts and proposes uniform laws for state legislatures to adopt. The ideal goal is that all states will adopt all uniform laws without changes. NCCUSL began work with commercial and divorce law.
The optimism of NCCUSL’s founders was palpable; its
first report asserted: “It is probably not too much to say that
this is the most important juristic work undertaken in the United States since the adoption of the Federal [C]onstitution.”55
While uniform laws have had some success, it has not matched
these hopes. While it had fair success with commercial law in
its first years, it flopped with divorce law. In the first century of
its existence, NCCUSL proposed approximately 200 uniform
acts. Only about ten percent of these acts were adopted by as
many as forty states; more than half were adopted by fewer
than ten states. 56

54 See, e.g., United States Ombudsman Association, Model Ombudsman Act for State
Governments (1997), available at
http://www.usombudsman.org/documents/PDF/References/USOA_MODEL_AC
T.pdf; Centers for Law and the Public's Health: A Collaborative at Johns Hopkins
and Georgetown Universities, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act
(2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Resources/Modellaws.htm.
55 See Leonard A. Jones, Uniformity of Laws Through National and Interstate Codification,
in REPORT OF THE SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 157,
169 (1894), reprinted in 28 AM. L. REV. 547 (1894).
56 James J. White, One Hundred Years of Uniform State Laws: Ex Proprio Vigore, 89
MICH. L. REV. 2096, 2103-05 (1991).
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Uniform laws encounter a host of problems some of
which are inherent in the task and some of which are peculiar
to the American form. These problems range from the political
to the technical. They include:
(i) A perception that they lack drafting legitimacy. Legislation is normally subject to political compromise. But there is no
democratic representation in the drafting of uniform laws.
While drafting sessions are open to the public, not surprisingly,
the industries most immediately concerned are best
represented. There is a perception in many members of the bar
and public that the uniform laws projects are “captured” by
those industries. (E.g., Article 9, bankers; UCITA/proposed Article 2B, software).
(ii) A perception that they are supportive of status quo. This
perception is often reality. Uniform laws are sold to state legislature as mere technical matters that rationalize existing law
and acknowledge industry practices. They should not launch
off in the direction of law reform. Even the perception that they
are new can lead to defeat. Many of the provisions attacked in
UCITA/proposed Article 2B were challenged by consumer
groups even though they did not go beyond existing law. Already approved amendments to Article 2 were cut back to
garner support.
(iii.) Non-universal adoption. If uniform laws are to provide legal unification, all fifty states should adopt them. There
is no political base that can help bring that about; the sponsoring organization must rely principally on good will. It is thus
no wonder that so few uniform laws have been adopted universally.
(iv.) Non-uniform adoptions. As laws of the individual
states, the adopting states may vary the uniform laws as they
see fit. Many do. Indeed, some of the uniform laws (e.g., Article
2 of the U.C.C.) even offer legislatures alternative provisions.
Insofar as there are interest groups that care about those laws,

U.S. National Report

29

those groups get fifty chances to get changes made in the law
that they could not get made at the drafting stage.
(v.) Non-uniform interpretation. No statute is perfect nor
can any statute anticipate all issues that are likely to arise under
it. Judicial interpretation has a critical role in keeping uniform
law current. Yet, since uniform laws are by definition laws of
the several states, there is no court that can authoritatively interpret them. Until there is such a court—as was proposed as
long ago as 1917—no uniform law that has been the subject of
judicial interpretation is likely to be uniform. 57
(vi.) Not amendable. Recent experiences with the Uniform
Commercial Code call into question whether uniform laws can
be effectively amended. While the drafting process was concluded in less than ten years, the adoption process in the following eight has few successes to claim.
(b) Restatements and the American Law Institute
The American Law Institute was founded in 1923 by
practicing jurists and academics. Its membership consists of individual jurists and is self-selecting. Its initial project was the
creation of a “Restatement” of American law. As originally
conceptualized, the Restatement was to define scientifically legal terminology and through the intellectual strength of its system, to be relied upon by courts in deciding lawsuits. What was
originally to be a single restatement turned into restatements of
particular areas of the law. Most commonly these are areas
where state law dominates. The American Law Institute
branched out from restatement to develop “model laws” and to
join the NCCUSL in the Uniform Commercial Code. Model
laws differ from uniform laws in that there is no expectation
that a model law will be adopted by all states verbatim.
57
See Herbert Pope, The Federal Courts and a Uniform Law, 28 YALE L. J. 647, 651 (1919)
(proposing entrusting federal courts of appeal with the task of reviewing uniform
legislation with a newly established federal court to review their decisions)
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Restatements have as their audience principally the judiciary. They are not adopted by legislatures as a whole but by
judges piecemeal. While they help to systematize legal analysis,
they have not brought about unification. They do promote
harmonization and often (but not always) ward off worst cases
of conflicting rules.
The founders of the American Law Institute were no less
optimistic about their work than were the foundeers of
NCCUSL about theirs. The ALI founders compared their task
to that faced by the lawyers of Justinian’s day who “produced
the codification and exposition of that law which has been the
main foundation of all the law of the civilized world except the
law of the English speaking people.”58

Top down or coordinate involvement in (a) restatements, (b) uniform law and (c) private standard setting appears
both to be possible and yet rare. Its rarity is fairly easily accounted for. On the one hand, the federal and state authorities
do not have the political interest required for continued involvement. On the other hand, the level of continued involvement required is great. Yet the effect of that involvement is uncertain and indirect. Restatements, uniform laws and private
standards do not have the force of law by themselves, but require action by other players to attain that status. Constituencies with particular interests are more likely to be able to rouse
themselves to participate in such activities. In such cases proposed legislation can become identified with those constituencies and then fail of adoption (e.g., Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act).
4. The role of legal education and training in unification of law
58 REPORT OF THE FORTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 90
(1923); William Draper Lewis, The American Law Institute, 25 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT’L L.
25, 28 (1943).
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Legal education has been a major force for harmonization, if not unification of law, through law schools, their professors and bar examinations. Legal training has not been a force
for harmonization, but neither has it been a force promoting
non-uniformity of law, because it no longer exists. While apprentice training was one the exclusive path to the bar, it largely disappeared in the course of the 19th century. The United
States is alone among the world’s major legal systems in not
having a system of formal practical training corresponding to
“articling” in other Common Law countries, similar apprenticing in other civil law countries or to government training
known in Germany and Japan.
a. Law schools
Law school began as supplement for law office training
and, in the course of the 19th century, became their substitute.
Before the Civil War (1861-1865) there were few law schools.
All were private and some were independent of institutions of
higher learning. From their earliest days, law schools, for financial self-preservation, sought students from outside their immediate states of location. Law students, having few schools to
choose from, attended schools outside their home states.
Today, nearly all American law schools draw significant
numbers of students from states outside their states of location.
Not all law schools, however, draw from throughout the federal system to the same extent. Some do so nationally, some regionally and some locally. Over the last century all have tended
to expand the areas from which they draw. To similar extents,
graduates of these law schools practice outside the states of
their law schools’ locations.
Today, and for a very long time, most American law
schools have not focused on teaching the law of their states of
location. They concentrate on federal law in areas where federal law predominates, such as bankruptcy, constitutional law,
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intellectual property, antitrust, securities regulation and taxation, as well as in other areas where federal law serves as model law, such as civil and criminal justice and administrative
law. In areas where state law predominates, such as contracts,
property, torts, family law and inheritance law, they concentrate not on the law of specific component states but on a hypothetical law of an amalgam of all states.
American legal methods tend to support this homogenizing approach. American law schools stress the skill of arguing specific points in issue rather than skills of interpreting
and applying systematic statutes to facts. Since argument take
priority, skill at identifying the precedents needed to make the
argument are more important than systematic understanding
of a specific body of law.
American law schools have a positive effect for harmonization of law. That effect is widely recognized. When they
teach state law, they teach an homogenized law the basics of
which applies equally well in all states. When they teach federal law, they teach a presumptively superior law on which states
ought to model their laws.
Oddly, American law schools do not have such a positive effect on unification of law. Indeed, they may have a negative effect. This effect is scarcely noticed.
Uniform law by its nature cannot be case law—at least,
not where there is a multitude of case-law making courts. It
must be statutory law; that is, it must consist of, ideally, a single authoritative text. But law schools generally give statutes
short shrift. The issue-focused nature of American litigation
tends to prefer study of case law based solutions. For example,
to this day, some American law school first year contracts
classes study only the common law of contracts and do not give
the the Uniform Commercial Code (”UCC”) much attention.
Those who do include it, are forced to alert their students to the
inconsistencies that exist among the states in interpreting it. In
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general, the technique of teaching a non-existent national law,
means that there is no single authoritative text for state law.
They do not study a single authoritative text for one state with
a mind toward determining whether the state where teaching is
occurring, ought to adopt that law.
When law schools teach federal law, teaching does tend
to promote a single national interpretation of that federal law.
But federal law is, as we have seen, often only an overlay on
state law. Yet it is an overlay that sometimes focuses on problems that are quite different from the same problems in state
courts. For example, federal courts in so-called diversity jurisdiction cases consider only cases of at least $75,000. Procedures
suitable for such larger cases are not necessarily suitable for
smaller cases that the state systems address.
b. Law professors
Three of the nation’s first law professors, James Wilson,
James Kent and Joseph Story, were also leading judges of their
era and leading promoters of uniform national law. All three
conceptualized—and Kent and Story actualized—plans for law
commentaries designed to bring certainty and uniformity to
law in America.
For most of the nation’s history, through such commentaries, law professors have contributed positively to increasing
harmony and uniformity in law. They typically played the
leading role in third party legal harmonization through uniform laws, restatements and model laws. They typically serve
as principal “reporters” for these projects.
In recent years, however, many, if not most, law professors have turned away from activities that promote unification
and towards more particularist pursuits. At elite law schools
professors now prefer social science scholarship about law and
rarely engage in doctrinal writing that might contribute to unification of law. At non-elite schools professors prefer clinical
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and other practical education to legal scholarship. Focused as
this education is on local practice, it does little to promote unification of law.
c. Admission to practice
Admission to practice is admission by component state.
While some federal courts have their own procedures and
some have special rules, the states are responsible for issuing
licenses to practice law.
Testing for admission to practice is, however, only partly
by component state. To a degree that varies among the states,
they incorporate in their own testing procedure tests developed
by a third-party, independent, non-governmental body, the National Conference of Bar Examiners.
All but two states, Washington and Louisiana, use the
Multistate Bar Exam, for one day of their two-or-three day state
bar exams. The Multistate Bar Exam consists of 200 multiple
choice questions on the topics of contracts, torts, constitutional
law, criminal law, evidence, and real property. These questions
are not jurisdiction-specific but test issues that should have the
same solutions in all states.
Louisiana does not participate, presumably, because its
own legal heritage, while much influenced by the common law,
has a predominantly civil law origin. So in core private law
areas of contracts, torts and real property, its legal approaches
differ from those of other states and are non-uniform.
d. Post-Graduate Legal Education and Post-Admission
Legal Training
The United States has no independent legal research institutes comparable to the renowned Max Planck Institutes in
Germany. American law schools do not have a tradition of
scientific study of law and do not offer American law students
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as a matter of course the opportunity to do doctoral work in
law.59 They do offer American and foreign law students alike
many opportunities for a fourth year of legal education in the
form of studies for masters’ degrees. Often, these degrees have
a particular subject matter focus.
While practical training is not required for admission to
practice, most jurisdictions now require practitioners participate in what is called “continuing legal education” (“CLE”) following admission to practice. Requirements vary state-by-state.
Most CLE programs are independent of the law schools and are
offered by bar associations, other lawyer associations or proprietary bodies. While directed generally by practitioners with
practice in mind, they are not apprentice-type programs. They
take place in classroom settings.
Graduate and continuing legal education in their relationship to unification of law tend to mirror law school education. Graduate education tends more toward central, while continuing legal education tends more toward component state
law.
5. Influence of international law on legal unification
Where the federal government enters into a treaty obligation, that obligation can create uniform domestic law. This
can occur where the federal government may otherwise not
have authority to act. 60 There is no need for the states to take
separate action. International law is American law. Thus when
the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of
Goods took effect, it became uniform law for all fifty states.
Such cases are rare and are likely to be all the rarer in the
future. Since ratification of CISG, the Congress has shown inThe J.S.D., or S.J.D. (doctorate of juridical science), is not routinely offered or
granted to others besides foreign jurists and American academics already holding
teaching positions.
60 See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
59
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creased hostility to treaties, such as CISG, that are selfexecuting, i.e., that require no further legislation by Congress.
Still, insofar as Congress adopts law, either through a selfexecuting treaty or through legislation implementing a nonself-executing treaty, the international law will become a uniform American law.
Compliance with international legal obligations only exceptionally plays a role in unification and then a minor one.
Voluntary international coordination play a role, but it is
very minor. Although the United States participates in such voluntary coordination, American legal institutions not infrequently ignore or even rebuff actual cooperation.
IV. Institutional and Social Background
1. Judicial branch
a. Judicial review of federal and state action
The United States Supreme Court polices whether either
Congress or the states have impermissibly exceeded their respective lawmaking powers. The procedure and substance of
that review, however, contribute substantially to making
American law non-uniform and uncertain.
(a) The Court cannot review legislation before it takes effect; it has no authority of abstract review. Early in its history it
created the “case or controversy” requirement. That doctrine
demands that the courts may review the constitutionality of a
law only when the law is applied in a concrete case. This delays
resolution of these questions. Until overturned, laws are presumptively valid; the law-abiding must comply with them if
they can.
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(b) The Court does not have a monopoly of judicial review of constitutionality; review is not concentrated. Lower and
state courts may determine the issue of constitutionality. The
Supreme Court reviews exercises of lawmaking powers only in
the ordinary course of appellate decision making. Parties must
raise constitutional questions in the first instance of proceedings. Those courts cannot refer the questions to a constitutional
court. The court of first instance may try to avoid the constitutional issue. If it does reach the issue, the disappointed party
must then appeal the decision. Since most cases raising an issue
of distribution of power end up in an intermediate federal or
state appellate court, an exercise of lawmaking authority may
be upheld in one jurisdiction and not in another.
(c) The subject of the Court’s review—perhaps because
of the case or controversy requirement—tends to be application
of the law to an individual case, rather than a validation or invalidation of the law as a whole.
b. Judicial
legislation

review

and

harmonization

of

state

The United States Supreme Court is not authorized to
interpret state law authoritatively. Only exceptionally—and
then against substantial criticism—does it do so. 61
No single court has authority to interpret authoritatively
the uniform laws that the states adopt. This is possibly the biggest deficiency of the Uniform Commercial Code and of other
uniform laws. It has long been recognized. Issues of interpretation remain unresolved decades after the Uniform Commercial
Code first became law.
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to resolve
controversies between component states. Art. III, § 2.

61 See, e.g., Bush v Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341
U.S. 22 (1951).
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c. Dual court structures
There are parallel state and federal courts in both first
and appellate instances. The Constitution did not require, but
it does authorize, such dual structures 62 out of fear that state
courts would not enforce federal law. This system of competing
competencies complicates coordination and wastes judicial and
private resources. This waste is by and large accepted as a
necessary evil.
Most states now permit federal courts of appeals and
some other courts 63 to “certify” to their state’s highest court
questions of state law that may determine a cause and for
which there is no controlling state law precedent. In New York
the procedure has been available since 1986. From 1986 through
the end of 2005 federal courts certified 71 cases to New York’s
highest court, of which the court accepted 66. While there are
reasons peculiar to New York that explain this very low rate of
referral, New York’s experience tends to confirm this Reporter’s impression that this procedure has not become a measure
used routinely to promote uniformity and coordinate judiciaries. 64
2. Relations between the central and component state
governments
The central government cannot compel states to adopt
legislation. Such compulsion would considered an infringement of the sovereign prerogatives of the component states.
62 U.S.

CONST. art. III, § 1
Whether other courts are allowed to certify questions varies by state. Other courts
that may certify are federal district courts, federal bankruptcy courts and the highest
courts of sister states.
64 Advisory Group to the New York State and Federal Judicial Council, Practice
Handbook on Certification of State Law Questions by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit to the New York State Court of Appeals (2nd ed.
2006), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/Cert.pdf. The New York procedure is available only to the federal courts and may be used by them sua sponte
only after a case has been fully-briefed and argued. At that point, certification is not
a time-saver, but a time waster.
63
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Nor, on the same ground, can the central government compel
component states to execute central government law.65
The component states and their government are not
represented at the central level. They have not been since 1913
(amend. XVII). Until 1912 each of the legislatures of the component states (art. 1, § 3, cl. 1) selected two senators in the United States Senate. Since 1913 the people of those states have
elected the senators directly.
Component state representatives at the central level are
elected by the people of the component states: senators by all
the people in the state, representatives by districts.
3.

Bureaucracy

The civil service of the central government is separate
from the civil services of the component states. There is no mobility between the separate civil service systems.
The lack of continuity in the upper levels of the bureaucracies—both of the central government and of the component
states—is a significant hindrance to unification of law.
4.

Social, regional and environmental factors
a. Social factors

In contemporary America social factors do not contribute greatly to disharmony of law. Federal law affirmatively
prohibits laws that discriminate based on race or ethnicity,
which thus largely assures harmony in these areas.
65 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). The Printz decision is at odds with earlier federal practice. The first Congress, in providing for implementation of the Congressional power “[t]o establish a uniform rule of naturalization, art. 1, § 2, cl. 4, provided for state court application of that uniform law. An Act to establish an Uniform
Rule of Naturalization of March 26, 1790, Statutes at Large, 1st Cong., 2nd Sess., 103.
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The social factor with the greatest present potential for
disharmony is gender-orientation. Although the Supreme
Court in 2003 in Lawrence v. Texas 66 invalidated state criminal
laws prohibiting consensual sexual conduct among same sex
couples, states continue to vary in their legal treatment of civil
relationships among same sex couples.
In the past, social factors were much more productive of
disharmony. Historically race was the most important. Even
after the Civil War put an end to the non-uniform law of slavery, the former slave states sought to preserve de jure social
separation of people (segregation) through so-called Jim Crow
laws. In contrast, northern states generally did not require de
jure segregation; some even prohibited de facto segregation. The
result was substantial disharmony from state-to-state. Some
states prohibited people of one race from attending school with
people of another race; other states did not. Some states prohibited people of one race from marrying people of another race;
other states did not. Some states prohibited innkeepers from
housing people of different races in the same facilities; other
states prohibited innkeepers from not housing people of different races in the same facilities. 67 The Supreme Court’s decision
in Plessy v. Ferguson, 68 which validated separate (“but equal”)
treatment of people based on race as consistent with the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, is today nearly
as infamous as the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision, which
held that Negros were not citizens of the United States. 69 Not
until nearly a half-century later, in 1954, in an equally famous
decision, Brown v. Board of Education, 70 did the Supreme Court
overturn Plessy. Subsequent to Brown the Court invalidated
other state laws making racially-based distinctions. For example, not until 1967 did it invalidate prohibitions on inter-racial
539 U.S. 588.
For a listing of the disparate laws as they stood in 1950, see STATES’ LAWS ON RACE
AND COLOR (Pauli Murray, ed., 1950). American race and nationality legislation was
of particular interest in Nazi Germany as a precedent for its own racist laws.
68 163 U.S. 537 (1906)
69 Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
70 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
66
67
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marriages (anti-miscegenation laws). 71 While the Brown decision is widely regarded as a triumph of American (litigationand case law-based) constitutional jurisprudence, it took a federal statute, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to impose national uniformity.72
While most state laws distinguishing people by race
were directed against persons of African descent, many found
applicability to persons of Asian descent as well to Native
Americans (American Indians). Some states also adopted laws
specifically directed to persons of Asian descent. These too, of
course, worked against uniformity of law.
Federal laws that made distinctions based on race principally involved immigration. They did not create nonuniformity of law, since immigration law is exclusively federal
law. The national government’s responsibility for native Americans tended to minimize state legislation and hence nonuniform treatment of that group.73
Formerly, ethnicity played a significant role in creating
disharmony in law among the states. Different states reacted to
immigrants with different laws. Some states supported immigrants by facilitating immigrants’ use of their mother tongues;
others sought to suppress such use. 74 Political considerations of
the day often played a part. During World War I there was a
wave of legislation prohibiting use of German and other languages. In 1923 in Meyer v. Nebraska the Supreme Court invalidated a state statute that prohibited teaching students in lanLoving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (overturning Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583
(1883).
72 Pub. L. 88-352. See Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by
Correcting the Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REV. 397, 440
(1999).
73 Although even here, there was some non-uniformity. In 1950 thirteen states prohibited sales of liquor to Native Americans, five prohibited marriages of Native Americans to white persons, and three provided for separate schools. STATES LAWS ON
RACE AND COLOR, supra note 67, at 19.
74 For a catalogue and analysis of such legislation, see HEINZ KLOß, DAS
VOLKSGRUPPENRECHT IN DEN VEREINIGTEN SYAATEN VON AMERIKA (2 vols., 1940-1942).
71
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guages other than English.75 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 put an
end to laws discriminating on the basis of an individual’s place
of national origin. But different states and jurisdictions still
treat differently the extent to which public services are to be
provided in English only or in additional languages.
The candidacy of Barack Obama for the presidency of
the United States well demonstrates that racial and ethnic differences are of declining importance. It also demonstrates,
however, that race remains more important than ethnicity. He
is usually identified as a “black” candidate and only rarely as a
“second generation Kenyan or African” candidate.
b. Regional Factors
That different groups settled the United States at different times and places has led to regional variations in law. These
variations go back to the earliest days of the country. Massachusetts was settled initially by Puritans from England, while
Pennsylvania was settled by Quakers from England and Germans from the Palatinate. Maryland was settled as a refuge for
Roman Catholics. Other southern states were settled by second
sons of the English aristocracy and the enslaved AfricanAmericans they brought to tend their properties. In the Middle
West, Missouri, Illinois, Iowa, Ohio and Wisconsin were much
settled by Germans, while Scandinavians settled Minnesota.
Utah was founded by Mormons fleeing persecution in New
York, Illinois and Missouri. California was settle by Mexicans
and by Americans seeking gold.
These different patterns of settlement have played a role
in the uniformity and in the disharmony of the nations’ laws.
Before the Civil War northern states were seen to prefer settling
disputes by law, while southern states were thought to prefer
duels pursuant to “codes of honor.” Massachusetts has long
262 U.S. 390. Justice Holmes would have upheld the prohibition [sic!]. See WILLIAM
G. ROSS, FORGING NEW FREEDOMS. NATIVISM, EDUCATION, AND THE CONSTITUTION,
1917-1927 (1994).
75
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been considered to have creditor-friendly laws, while Texas
and Florida are seen to favor debtors. 76 Missouri is widely considered to have stayed in the Union in the Civil War because of
the strong hostility of the new German immigrants to slavery.
Utah was admitted to the Union only when the Mormon inhabitants agreed to outlaw bigamy, which was permitted by their
religion.
How much these different patterns of settlement continue to contribute to disparate law is well beyond the scope of
this report. It is a matter of social science. In terms of continuing day-to-day influences on law, regional environmental variations, with only a few exceptions, are of more significance
than are differences in ethnic or religious make-ups of the inhabitants of different states. Only in areas of recent immigration is there a noteworthy possibility of material disharmony in
law based on population characteristics. Even then, disharmony among the states is likely to be limited to the availability of
services in non-English languages.
c. Environmental Factors
Both the nature of the land and the patterns of settlement contribute to significant differences among the laws of the
states. In most of the West land is plentiful, but desert. In a
desert, issues of water rights take center stage. On some western highways, livestock enjoy the right-of-way (“open range
country”), while on eastern roads the owner is strictly liable for
them. Rights to the seashore vary from state-to-state.
More densely-settled areas were quicker to institute zoning controls. But Houston, a large and sprawling Texas city of
about two million people, still has no formal zoning code.
Laws controlling firearms vary enormously. Denselypopulated cities—using home rule authority—often have very
76

As we have seen in considering the homestead exemption in bankruptcy.

44

UNIFORM LAW AND NATIONAL LAW

restrictive controls. Thinly populated states oppose controls of
almost any kind.
V.

Unification Scorecard

See Unification Scorecard.
VI.

Conclusion

“Unification” does not well describe the legal system of
the United States. Unification is found only when law is
exclusively federal. In most areas of the law there are
significant non-uniformities between state and federal law and
among laws of states and of municipalities. The government
presents the people not with one law, but with a multitude of
laws. The people are left to sort out the various laws at their
peril.
Yet if law in the United States is not uniform, it is largely
harmonized.77 While there are numerous inconsistencies in
law, only rarely are these inconsistencies substantive at a
societal level (e.g., death penalty is some states, but not others;
stringent control of firearms in some places, lax in others).
Usually inconsistencies are in matters of detail only. These
details can, however, be extremely important in individual
cases (e.g., death penalty, statutes of limitation).
In everyday life, the devil is in detail. The
inconsistencies, while only in detail, nonetheless have very real
societal costs. American lawyers spend inordinate time
worrying which law applies and determining what that law is.
Accord, E. Hunter Taylor, Federalism or Uniformity of Commercial Law, 11 RUTGERSCAMDEN L.J. 527, 531 (1980) (“In sum, likeness rather than exactness—harmony rather than uniformity—has been the history of the “Uniform” Commercial Code, as
will inevitably be the result of any code or model act which must depend for its uniformity on state-by-state enactment.”)
77
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For half a century, if not longer, American jurists have accepted
these inefficiencies as “the price we pay for our federalism.”78
This price is so-well recognized, that most lawyers
simply assume that the system could not exist without it. In
blissful ignorance of alternative solutions, they and the public
at large do not regularly challenge this enormous waste.
Less-well recognized, are other costs that some may
debate, but that seem real to this Reporter:
(1) Undermining respect for law. Law is realized when
people abide by and enforce it. Numerous inconsistencies in
law complicate abiding by law and enforcing it. Law-abiding
begins to look like a game that only suckers play. In short, they
strike at the efficacy of law. 79
(2) It little recognized that disparate laws are deficient
laws. When all solutions are equally valid, none is preferred.
When each component state goes its own way willy-nilly, no
way is identified as the best way. Instead of one law being
subject to careful consideration in drafting and improvement in
application, many laws are haphazardly drafted and carelessly
applied.
(3) Disparate laws invite undue influence or particularist
influence.
To this Reporter, neither the recognized, nor the
unrecognized costs seem worth paying. The cacophony of nonuniform law should long ago have been replaced by the
harmony of uniform or better national law. The legal system is
indeed a lagging indicator. More than a century and a third ago
one critic rightly noted:

Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 380 (1958) (opinion by Frankfurter, J.).
Taking a similar view, see Herbert Pope, The Federal Courts and a Uniform Law, 28
YALE L. J. 647 (1919).
78
79
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[A]s the country has grown older, the people of
the United States as a whole—in their personal
relations—have become far more united and
harmonious than have the various systems of
State law by which their commercial and
domestic interests are largely governed. For this
reason the constant conflict of law which daily
arises in the affairs of our national life, with its
consequent uncertainties, is becoming an evil so
serious that it must soon pass from the hands of
the theorist to those of the practical statesman. 80

HANNIS TAYLOR, AN INTER-STATE CODE COMMISSION (1881), reprinted in REPORT OF
ORGANIZATION AND OF THE FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD ANNUAL MEETINGS OF THE
ALABAMA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 210 (1882).
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